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LABOR ARBITRATION AWARDS
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF LABOR
ARBITRATION AWARDS
Walter E. Boles, Jr.*
V OLUNTARY arbitration offers the best and probably the only
hope for survival of collective bargaining and free employer-
union relations.' Imposition of compulsory arbitration and settle-
ment of labor disputes by .government courts or boards is the
alternative.2
Purpose here is to consider some aspects of one phase of labor
arbitration law: that concerning the arbitrator's decision or
"award." What are the legal requirements as to form at common
law and under arbitration statutes? What is the legal nature of an
award? Is it a contract? A judgment? How is it enforced? Under
what conditions can an award be challenged successfully at com-
mon law? Under statute? Should arbitration awards serve as
"precedents" in the industrial relations field? These questions are
considered here.
*Professor of Economics, Southern Methodist University; Public Member, Tenth
Regional Wage Stabilization Board, Dallas, Texas; member, Texas Bar;
Ph.D., Vanderbilt; LL.B., Southern Methodist University.
i l,.[I]n ... [arbitration] lies the major hope of preserving the bargaining process
in labor relations, and thus of saving both industry and labor from the evils of domina-
tion by officialdom." Frey, The Logic of Collective Bargaining and Arbitration, 12 L. &
Contemp. Prob. 264, 271 (1947).
2 "... [Clompulsory arbitration would be a long step toward centralized control of
the economy by the federal government. It may be possible in theory for government to
control wages without controlling prices and profits, but it would be very difficult to do
this in practice.... While in principle a government arbitration board may be exercis-
ing authority over unions and managements, in practice both labor and management
will be doing their best to control the policies of the board. The history of the National
War Labor Board [World War II] provides abundant evidence of this tendency. Govern.
ment decision of the terms of employment, then, is bound to mean decision based on
political pressures and expediency rather than on ideal standards worked out by uni-
versity professors. One should discard any notion that compulsory arbitration would
lead to perfect justice or complete industrial peace. Where labor is politically powerful,
it is not feasible simply to 'crack down' on strikes, even though they may violate an
established arbitration procedure." REYNOLDS, LAPC.R ECONOAMICS AND LABOR RELATIONS
(1st ed. 1949) 305, 306.
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1. REQUIREMENTS AS TO FORM
At common law no particular form of award is prescribed.' It
may be written or oral. The parties may, of course, stipulate in
the submission agreement' that it be in writing and may specify
a particular form for it to take. Williston says that at common
law, unless the submission agreement expressly or impliedly auth-
orizes a majority to make the award, all members of an arbitration
tribunal must concur.'
Arbitration statutes usually fix precise requirements concerning
the form of the award.6 The New York statute, for example, pro-
vides that an enforceable award must be in writing. The arbitrator
or arbitrators must subscribe it. And they must sign it within the
time limit if a limit is set in the submission agreement. The award
must be "acknowledged" or "proved," and "certified" as if it were
a deed to be recorded. Then it must either be filed in the office of
the clerk of the appropriate court, or delivered to one of the
8 Some arbitrators simply announce their awards in a brief sentence and do not write
an opinion explaining how and why they decided as they did. This is bad procedure,
indeed. Effective, carefully-drafted opinions explaining and defending awards can
become "documents" in the industrial relations field and are absolutely essential if
"awards" are to have precedential value in settlement of labor disputes. But at this point
we are concerned only with the award itself, which usually is couched in some such lan-
guage as: "My award is... that X be reinstated to her job at the Ypsilanti Generator
Plant without loss of seniority and with back pay for the time lost between the date
of her discharge and her employment at the Bomber Plant, in accordance with Para.
29 (10) (F) of the parties' agreement." Ford Motor Co. and UAWU, CIO, 1 A. L. A. A.
§ 67,014 (1944). Or, "AWARD. By reason of the clear terms of Para. 'Nineteenth' of
the agreement, the Arbitrator finds and awards that the wage rates of the employees
involved herein be increased by 6% retroactive to February 2, 1947." Swiss American
Watch Hospital, Inc., and Retail and Wholesale Employees' Union, Local 830, CIO,
2 A. L. A. A. § 67,711 (1947).
4 No special form is required at common law for the "submission agreement" (to
arbitrate an existing dispute). If form requirements are set forth in an arbitration stat-
ute, they must be followed to the letter. Here is a reasonably typical example of submis-
sion agreement: "It is hereby agreed by the parties listed below that the issues described
below shall be heard by an Arbitrator to be named by ----.... The issues to be deter-
mined are as follows: ------------- The decision of the Arbitrator shall be final and binding
upon the parties." (Signature of parties.) Chicago Flexible Shaft Co. and U. E. R. &
M. W. of America, 5 C. L. E. § 64,601 (1947).
5 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. Ed. 1938) § 1929.
e The Texas statute provides only that the award shall be in writing (TEx. REv. Civ.
STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 231) and in triplicate (art. 248). One copy is to be filed in
the office of the clerk of the district court in the county where the labor arbitration is
held, one goes to the employer and the third is for the employee(s).
[Vol. 5
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parties or to his attorney.7 Such statutory requirements must be
followed very carefully and must be complied with strictly. The
importance of this is that if the award is not in the proper form
it will not be enforceable under the method provided in the statute.
And, since the "statutory" method of enforcement usually is speed-
ier and less complicated and more inexpensive than the "common
law" enforcement proceedings, the parties simply cannot afford
awards which are improper in form. Williston indicates, however,
that if an award rendered under what has purported to be a statu-
tory arbitration fails because it is not in the form prescribed by
the statute, it still may be enforceable as a common law award.'
2. LEGAL NATURE OF THE AWARD
Is an arbitration award a contract? A judgment? Updegraff and
McCoy say it is neither, though it partakes of the nature of both.9
It results from a contract-the submission agreementl-but it is
not itself a contract. Consider an example. In one arbitration the
parties agreed in the submission that they would comply with the
award, as follows:"
"[The parties] have agreed to submit to you the following issue for
final and binding arbitration: Under the contract between the Company
and the Union, are employees Jenkins and Steddenbenz entitled to the
method of pay they were receiving prior to August 24, 1938? ... Both
parties and the employees involved will accept your decision as final
and binding." (Signatures of te parties.)
7 N. Y. CIvIL PRACTICE ACT, § 1460.
8 6 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 5, § 1928. In Ferguson vs. Ferguson, 93 S. W. 2d 513,
516 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) (involving arbitration of controversies arising out of settle-
ment of an estate), Justice Funderburk said that if the award in question could not be
held sufficient as a statutory award "then as against the attack made upon it, it was
sufficient as a common-law award." He continued, "The award, if the arbitration was
statutory, had the effect of a judgment, and if common-law, had the effect of a contract,
alike conclusive upon the parties as to all matters of fact and law, in the absence of
partiality, fraud, mistake, or gross error, duly pleaded and proved such as would war-
rant the setting aside of a judgment or a contract."
9 UPDEGRAFF AND McCoy, ARBITRATION OF LABOR DISPUTES (1st ed. 1946) 124.
:o See supra note 4.
11 Nat'l Malleable & Steel Castings Co. and UAW, 3 A. L. A. A. § 68,158 (1949).
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Thus the parties contracted to abide by the award, which in this
case read as follows :12
"It is awarded that under the current contract between the employer
and union herein concerned, the company was entitled to announce and
put into effect the changes in the duties, job designation and compen-
sation herein concerned."
The award, to repeat, results from the submission agreement or
contract. And after the award is made the parties are bound by
their submission agreement to abide by it. Thus, the award "par-
takes of the nature of a contract."'" But the award is the act of the
arbitrator and not the parties themselves; so in this respect it dif-
fers from a contract.14
How does an arbitration award resemble a judgment? 5 "It par-
takes of the nature of a judgment in that, if it is valid, it is binding
upon [the parties] though imposed by an outside source. It is in
fact an extrajudicial judgment of a tribunal selected by and given
power by the act of the parties."'" Or, as another source puts it,
"... [A]n award of arbitration upon a matter in difference be-
12 Ibid.
13 UPDEGRAFF AND McCoY, op. cit. supra note 9 at 125.
14 Professor Alexander H. Frey of the University of Pennsylvania Law School says,
"In agreeing to arbitrate, the disputants in effect execute a contract with some blank
terms in it; they authorize the arbitrator to fill in the blanks for them, and what he fills
in becomes their contract. Thus the same morality that recognizes the sanctity of a con-
tract also sustains an arbitration award." Frey, op. cit. supra note 1 at 277. Justice Stay-
ton, in Myers v. Easterwood, 60 Tex. 107, 110 (1883), wrote, "The award of the arbi-
trator is substantially the agreement of the parties, for they each empowered the arbitra-
tor to ascertain and declare the terms of the agreement, and by his award, when fairly
made, they ought to be as much bound as though they had made an agreement directly
between themselves, embracing the terms of the award."
15 In Jones v. Frosh, 6 Tex. 202, 204 (1851), Justice Lipscomb stated,
".. .I take it to be an acknowledged rule of law that an award not impeach-
able with fraud is conclusive of all matters that had been submitted to the arbitra-
tors. It is as much so as a judgment, and in the language of Chief Justice DeGray
in the Dutchess [sic] of Kingston's case, is as a plea, a bar, or as evidence con-
clusive between the same parties upon the same matters."
See City of San Antonio v. McKenzie Const. Co., 136 Tex. 315, 150 S. W. 2d 989 (1941);
4 TEX. JuR., Arbitration and Award, § 22.
'6 UPDEGRAFF AND McCoY, op. cit. supra note 9 at 125.
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tween parties is regarded as the judgment of a court of last resort
"117for that controversy....
3. ENFORCING THE AWARD AT COMMON LAW
Suppose neither party has revoked the arbitration agreement,
the hearing has been held and the arbitrator has made his award.
Assume that the losing party then refuses to abide by the terms
of the decision. Williston writes, ".... [T] common law favored
enforcement of arbitration awards; and it was rare for them to be
invalidated; in fact, they were accorded almost the protection of a
judgment of a court at law."'" It would appear that in general the
award may either be the subject of a suit at law to recover money
damages, or a suit in equity to obtain a decree of specific per.
formance. 9
Specific performance of labor arbitration awards certainly
should be decreed when money damages prove inadequate, and
it appears that an increasing number of courts are inclined to de-
cree specific enforcement wherever necessary to effectuate such
awards. "It is possible," states Teller, "to say today that the main-
tenance of a management-union relationship under a collective bar-
gaining agreement is a general ground of equity jurisdiction."2"
He argues that a kind of "new jurisprudence" is developing. That
is, Teller recognizes that courts of equity have long been disin-
clined to enforce contracts calling for the rendering of personal
services. 2 ' But he believes that "remedies applicable to collective
agreements are viewed entirely differently by the courts from
remedies relating to individual employment contracts."2 2 Courts,
17 3 AM. JUR., Arbitration and Award, § 135.
Is 6 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 5, § 1929A.
19 3 Am. Jun., Arbitration and Award, § 167.
Just why courts generally favor awards but not arbitration agreements is not clear.
No good reason has been advanced for this distinction. See Simpson, Specific Enforce-
ment of Arbitration Contracts, 83 U. Pa. L. Rev. 162-164 (1934).
20 Teller, Specific Remedies in Labor Arbitration, 3 Arb. J. (N. S.) 176, 179 (1948).
21 4 PoMERoY's EQUITY JURIsPRUDENCE (5th ed. 1941) § 1343.
22 Teller, op. cit. supra note 20 at 178. In support of this, Teller might well have
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that is, are likely now to order an employer to honor an arbitra-
tor's award under a union contract restoring an employee's job,
though the same court would be disinclined to order Mrs. Smith to
continue to give employment to the maid she had fired in violation
of an individual contract of employment. Teller says that "the
Wagner Act (carried forward in the Taft-Hartley Act), authoriz-
ing the reinstatement of discriminatorily discharged employees,
has served to point up this distinction, and has helped to provide
a basis for the new jurisprudence."2 He concludes that "the cases
appear to be tending toward greater recognition of the propriety
of specific enforcement [of arbitration awards]. '"24
Since, however, collective bargaining and the reinstatement of
employees discharged for union activity have been stressed as
public policy in the United States only during the past sixteen
years or so, it is probable that the "new jurisprudence" has not yet
been embraced by all our courts. Law tends to lag behind market
practices, labor market or otherwise, though probably not so far
behind as some would have us believe. All we are saying here is
that there appears to be a general trend to decree specific perform-
ance of arbitration awards, including those ordering reinstatement
of employees who have not been discharged "for cause."
4. STATUTORY ENFORCEMENT OF AWARDS: STATES
Consider now enforcement procedure under arbitration statutes.
Almost all the general arbitration statutes25 provide a special
quoted Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking for the Court in J. I. Case Co. v. N. L. R. B., 321
U. S. 332, 334, 335 (1944):
"Collective bargaining between employer and the representatives of a...
union, results in an accord as to terms which will govern hiring and work and pay
in that unit. The result is not, however, a contract of employment except in rare
cases; no one has a job by reason of it and no obligation to any individual ordi-
narily comes into existence from it alone. The negotiations between union and
management result in what often has been called a trade agreement, rather than
in a contract of employment.... After the collective trade agreement is made, the
individuals who shall benefit by it are identified by individual hirings."
2I Id. at 178, 179.
2,Id. at 180.
25 "General" arbitration statutes-which have been enacted in a majority of the
states-were not designed specifically to cover labor arbitration. Their framers had
(Vol. 5
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method of enforcing awards, the objective being to simplify and
speed up the procedure and avoid the necessity of a full-fledged
suit.2" That is, such statutes generally provide that awards may be
made court judgments on motion of either party or on the mere
filing of the award in court. The New York statute, for example,
provides that a party may apply to the appropriate court for an
order confirming the award; then, unless the other party can attack
the award successfully on the grounds set forth in the statute,2" the
court must grant the order and judgment may then be entered on
the award.2" Such a judgment then may be enforced in the same
manner as other court judgments.
Under the Texas labor arbitration statute the award "shall go
into practical operation" when a copy is filed in the district clerk's
office of the county where the arbitration was held, and "judgment
commercial arbitration in mind. But most of these general statutes are framed in such
broad and general terms that they are applicable to labor disputes. The Texas commer-
cial arbitration statute (TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) arts. 224-238) was passed
originally in 1846. Arts. 239-249, enacted originally in 1895, provide specifically for
labor arbitration.
For detail on general arbitration laws see the valuable "Analytical Table of General
Arbitration Statutes" in LABOR ARBITRATION UNDER STATE STATUTES (U. S. Dept. Labor,
1943) 43-59; Dowell, Judicial Enforcement of Labor Arbitration Awards in Labor Dis-
putes' 3 Rutgers U. L Rev. 9, notes 56, 57, 58 (1949); Gregory and Orlikoff, The
Enforcement of Labor Arbitration Agreements, 17 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 233 (1950).
Larson, The Legal Status of Arbitration in the Southwest in SECOND ANNUAL INSTI-
TUTE ON LABOR LAW (Southwestern Legal Foundation, 1950) 84-92, discusses arbitra-
tion statutes of Texas, New Mexico, Arkansas, and Louisiana. He points out that Okla-
homa has no conventional arbitration statute, common law prevailing there without
statutory modification. New Mexico's arbitration statute, enacted in 1859, seems to be
aimed primarily at "ordinary civil controversies," but "it would seem that the legisla-
tion would apply to labor disputes concerning interpretation and application [but not
concerning negotiation] of a collective contract." Id. at 86. About the same comment
is made concerning the Arkansas arbitration statute (ARK. STAT. 1947 ANN. §§ 34-501,
34-510). Id. at 87. Larson discusses at some length the arbitration legislation of Louisi-
ana, which is scattered through the Civil Code, the Code of Practice, and the General
Statutes. He summarizes by saying, "... Louisiana law makes agreements to arbitrate
present and future labor disputes irrevocable and specifically enforceable. A careful
procedure has been worked out to give the arbitration award the status of a judgment
which can be enforced." Id. at 92.
28 Three general arbitration statutes provide that the only enforcement technique is
the common law method of an independent suit on the award: Iowa, Kentucky, Ten-
nessee. Dowell, op. cit. supra note 25 at 80, 81, n. 66.
27 These are discussed infra.
28 N. Y. CIVIL PRACTrCE ACT, § 1461.
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shall be entered thereon accordingly, at the expiration of ten days
from such filing, unless within such ten days either party shall file
exceptions thereto for matter of law apparent on the record...
5. STATUTORY ENFORCEMENT OF AWARDS: FEDERAL
It is not certain that the Federal Arbitration Act covers arbitra-
tion of labor disputes pursuant to a clause in a collective bargain-
ing agreement: federal circuit courts of appeals have held both
ways."o It will not be amiss, however, to mention enforcement pro-
20 T x. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 248. Some eleven states have enacted
special statutes bearing on labor disputes which have had very little effect on develop-
ment of labor arbitration as a whole. They dea! mainly with negotiation disputes, rather
than grievances arising from already bargained union-management contracts. They are
confined mainly to public utilities or certain public enterprises such as hospitals. And
they usually provide for a kind of compulsory arbitration. These special enactments con-
tain fewer references to court appeals and court judgments than do the "general" arbi-
tration statutes. Under most of them the only enforcement technique is the common law
method of an independent suit on the award. Dowell, op. cit. supra note 25 at 80, 91;
Gregory and Orlikoff, op. cit. supra note 25 at 244.
Florida, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, Pennsyl-
vania, Texas, Virginia and Wisconsin have such laws, according to Gregory and Orli-
koff, op. cit. supra note 25 at 242, n. 45. But "compulsory investigation" is about all the
Texas "special" statute calls for. TEx. REv. CiV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) arts. 5183-5190.
This act created the Texas Industrial Commission in 1920, with one member each for
employers and labor and three representing the public. The governor is empowered to
refer to this commission labor disputes he considers "of public concern or interest."
After public hearings on the controversy, the commission reports, with recommenda-
tions, the results of the investigation to the governor and legislature. The 1947 Odessa
telephone strike was the most recent occasion for action tinder this statute.
3o Section 1 of the statute provides that "nothing herein contained sha.l apply to
contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 1. Two circuit courts
of appeals have held that this provision applies throughout the Act. Gatliff Coal Co. v.
Cox, 142 F. 2d 876 (6th Cir. 1944) ; Internat. Union of United Furn. Workers v. Colonial
Hardwood Floor Co., 168 F. 2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948). But another court of equal stature
has ruled that this exclusionary language applies only to § 1 and not to the remainder
of the statute-that is, that § 1 simply defines the terms "maritime transactions" and
"commerce" and that the words "nothing herein contained" mean "contained" in § 1.
Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 138 F. 2d 3 (3d Cir. 1943) ; Watkins v. Hudson
Coal Co., 151 F. 2d 311 (3d Cir. 1945). Under this interpretation, the Court of Appea!s
for the Third Circuit has applied § 3 to disputes involving collective bargaining con-
tracts and has ordered suits stayed until arbitrations were held as provided for in the
contracts. In United Office & Professional Workers of America, CIO, v. Monumental
Life Ins. Co., 88 F. Supp. 602 (E. D. Pa. 1950), the district court applied the Federal
Arbitration Act to a dispute arising under a union contract, citing the Third Circuit
decisions in the Donahue and Watkins cases as binding. In 1951 the District Court for
the Southern District of New York applied the federal statute to a dispute originating
under a collective bargaining agreement. Lewittes & Sons v. United Furniture Workers
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cedure under that statute. Like many of the "general" state arbi-
tration laws, the federal Act provides that awards may be confirmed
by court order. Federal district courts are given this power. Appli-
cation for the confirmation order must be made within one year
after the award is handed down. Section 9 of the statute seems to
say that this procedure is available to the parties only if they
specify in their arbitration agreement that they will follow it."
The United States Supreme Court, however, has held that this stat-
utory method of enforcing the award is available even though the
arbitration agreement does not provide for it where the agreement
stipulated that the award should be "final and binding.""2 And the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that B impliedly
agreed to abide by the result of arbitration and to entry of judg-
ment on the award, even though the submission agreement con-
tained no authorization for entry of judgment, under these facts:
A sued B on a contract containing a provision requiring any dis-
pute arising out of it to be arbitrated; B pleaded the arbitration
clause as a "defense" and the trial court, in effect, agreed with B
of America, CIO, 95 F. Supp. 851. The court asserted: "The agreement in question is a
collective labor agreement, and, as such, is not a 'contract of employment.'... The
exception in Section 1 [contract of employment] was intended to avoid the specific per-
formance of contracts for personal services in accordance with the traditional judicial
reluctance to direct the enforcement of such contracts and it was not intended to apply
to collective labor agreements.... Where the parties manifest a purpose to dispose of
their disputes by arbitration rather than ... economic force.. ., their agreements should
be liberally construed with a view toward the encouragement of arbitration.. .. The
Courts should be reluctant 'to strike down a clause which appears to promote peaceful
labor relations rather than otherwise.' " Id. at 855, 856. See supra note 22.
The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Watkins case. 327 U. S.
777 (1946). This may mean the Court agrees with the more liberal interpretation of the
coverage of the Federal Arbitration Act. But the matter should be settled definitely-
and promptly-either by Supreme Court decision or by amendment of the Act. The
latter is preferable. Congress should state unequivocally that disputes arising out of
the negotiation or interpretation of collective bargaining agreements are covered by
the statute.
31 9 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 9. This section reads, "If the parties in their agreement have
agreed that a judgment of the court shall be entered upon the award ... and shall
specify the court, then at any time within one year after the award is made any par:v
... may apply.., for an order confirming the award, and.., the court must ur'int such
an order unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as specified in sections
10 and 11.. .."
32 Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 248 U. S. 263, 276 (1931).
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that A must submit to arbitration; the arbitration was held and B
lost; B refused to abide by the award; A then sought to have the
award enforced under the Federal Arbitration Act; elusive B then
asserted the court could not enter an order confirming the award
because the submission agreement had contained no such provi-
sion."3 Despite these two decisions, however, parties to labor arbi-
tration proceedings under the Federal Arbitration Act, when and
if it is applicable to labor disputes, will do well to provide in their
arbitration agreements that a judgment of a specified court shall
be entered upon the award.
The Railway Labor Act provides an elaborate procedure for the
enforcement of arbitration awards involving employees of inter-
state railroads and common carrier air lines engaged in interstate
or foreign commerce. The award of an arbitration board must be
filed with the clerk of the federal district court having jurisdic-
tion. Once filed and acknowledged, the award is conclusive as to
the merits and facts of the controversy unless, within ten days after
the filing, a petition to impeach the award is filed by the other
party in the clerk's office. The district court enters judgment on
the award if no such petition is filed, and the judgment is final
and conclusive on the parties. 4 But suppose one of the parties does
try to impeach or contest the award within the ten-day period after
the award is filed. The district court will make a decision on the
petition to impeach or contest and will enter a final judgment, one
way or the other, unless within ten days after its decision on the
petition to impeach or contest one of the parties appeals from the
decision to the appropriate United States court of appeals. The
action taken by the court of appeals in the matter is final.-5
6. CHALLENGING a COMMON LAW ARBITRATION AWARD
Once an award has been made, it is quite difficult to impeach it
successfully. It is said that this is because of the "dual or anoma-
33 Murray Oil Products Co., Inc., v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., 146 F. 2d 381, 383 (1944).
34 45 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 159 (second).
s5 45 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 159 (sixth).
[Vol. 5
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lous nature" of the award. That is, since it is not strictly a judg-
ment, not every valid ground for attack on a judgment is good
against an award. And, because the award is not entirely a con-
tract, some of the grounds for relief against performance of a
contract fail when raised against an arbitration award. And so, in
general, the ground urged against an award must be such as would
be good both for attack on a judgment and for relief against the
terms of a contract.
86
The general attitude of the common law can be summarized
like this: "As a rule... an award stipulated by the parties to be
final will not be set aside unless it is clearly made to appear that
there has been fraud by a party, or the arbitrators have mistaken
their authority, departed from the submission [agreement], clearly
misconceived their duties, acted upon some fundamental and ap-
parent mistake, or have been moved by fraud or bias."87
Fraud or misconduct or other undue means employed by a party
to the arbitration will render the award subject to impeachment.
For example, suppose an award was obtained because one of the
parties testified falsely or suppressed material facts.88 Parties to
arbitration proceedings should be very careful in communicating
privately with the arbitrator before the award is made, for courts
have set aside awards under such circumstances. 9 That is, the other
party should have an opportunity to hear or read all communica-
tions to the arbitrator from the opponent. True, it has been held
that if there appears to have been no corrupt motive and the award
was not influenced thereby, the mere fact that one party talked
with or wrote letters to an arbitrator about the case will not neces-
sarily cause the award to be set aside.0 But such actions are
dangerous and certainly should be avoided by the parties.
3S UPDEGRAFF AND McCoY, op. cit. supra note 9 at 126.
37 3 AM. JuR., Arbitration and Award, § 137.
as 6 C. J. S., Arbitration and Award, § 104 (b) (3).
s9 See note, 8 A. L. R. 1082, 1088 (1920). The cases cited deal with commercial arbi-
tration awards.
40 6 C. J. S., Arbitration and Award, § 104 (b) (4).
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Arbitration in some ways is judicial in nature. And if the parties
grasp this fact as they should, they will no more think of contact-
ing the arbitrator privately than they would think of making such
contact with a judge in whose court their case was being heard.
Confusion of the arbitrator's role with that of a "mediator" or
"compromiser" is hazardous indeed.4 Parties to an arbitration pro-
ceeding should restrain even their feelings of hospitality and good
fellowship toward the arbitrator. "For a party to furnish refresh-
ments or other entertainment to an arbitrator is highly improper
and will sometimes justify the setting aside of the award; but in
a few cases such relief has been refused, where it did not appear
that there was any intention to influence the award, or that it had
been so influenced." 42 An arbitrator worthy of the name will re-
fuse to accept private communications and wining and dining, and
41 Arbitration, looked upon as a second step in collective bargaining, certainly has
judicial aspects, being devoted mainly at present to interpretation of clauses and settle-
ment of disputes arising under union-management contracts-such contracts being the
end product of the first, or "legislative," step. Management and labor representatives
sit down across a table and negotiate a contract in what essentially is a "legislative"
process. Disputes inevitably arise about meaning and application of terms and clauses
in this contract, just as they do under a statute. And then, much as courts perform a
judicial function in resolving disputes under a statute, so do arbitrators function under
a collective bargaining agreement. "The function of an arbitrator is to decide disputes.
He should, therefore, adhere to such general standards of adjudicatory bodies as require
a full, impartial and orderly consideration of evidence and argument ..." See pamphlet,
Code of Ethics and Procedural Standards for Labor-Management Arbitration (Am.
Arb. Assn. 1951) 1, 2.
Experienced arbitrator Senator Wayne Morse supports the judicial concept of the
arbitration process and insists: "The arbitrator sits as a private judge, called upon to
determine the legal rights and economic interests of the parties .... The principle of
compromise has absolutely no p'ace in arbitration hearings." Morse, The Scope of Arbi-
tration in Labor Disputes, Commonwealth Review, March, 1941, p. 6. It can be argued
in support of this position that labor arbitration is a terminal step in dispute settement
under grievance procedure of a collective bargaining contract. That is, all the other
methods of dispute settlement presumably have been tried and found ineffective. It is
too late for mediation or conciliation: they had their day and they failed to bring com-
promise settlement. (Of course, if the parties decide in the course of an arl'itratinon
hearing to work out a compromise settlement, then that is well and good and the hear-
ing should be recessed for that purpose.) The point is simply that the arbitrator should
not assume the role of compromiser-nor should the parties expect him to assume it.
Failure to grasp the judicial nature of the arbitration process is like'y to lead parties
and arbitrators to jeopardize the effectiveness of this method of labor dispute settlement.
And in so doing they jeopardize industrial freedom.
42 6 C. J. S., Arbitration and Award, § 104 (b) (4).
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will avoid compromising situations of all kinds. But the parties
cannot always rely on the arbitrator to protect the award from
their perhaps well-meant but nonetheless knuckle-headed failure
to grasp the essential distinction between arbitration and compro-
mise. He may be a knuckle-head himself.4"
Consider fraud or misconduct by the arbitrator. Suppose, for
instance, he accepts a bribe. Just as such action by a judge would
be grounds for setting aside his judgment, so would it invalidate
the award of an arbitrator. Or suppose the arbitrator was grossly
unfair in conducting the hearing, as by arbitrarily refusing to re-
ceive proferred testimony material to the point in issue: his award
would be set aside." The authorities agree that awards which are
valid on their faces may be set aside in equity for misconduct by
the arbitrator. 45 But there is a scarcity of cases defining just what
acts, other than those already mentioned in this paragraph, will be
held to constitute such misconduct as to warrant interference by a
court of equity. This shortage of illustrative cases is especially
pronounced as far as labor arbitration is concerned. Here, how-
ever, are acts by arbitrators in "commercial" arbitrations which
the courts have held misconduct sufficient to impeach an award :46
(1) where the arbitrator acted under the direction of one of the
parties as an agent instead of an impartial judge;
(2) where the arbitrators adopted a chance or gambling method for
reaching their conclusion ;47
43 "We have as yet few competent arbitrators; and the specially-trained arbitrator is
a rare individual indeed." Gregory and Orlikoff, The Enforcement of Labor Arbitration
Agreements, 17 U. Chi. L. Rev. 233, 269 (1950).
4 3 Am. JUR., Arbitration and Award, § 143.
45 See 3 AM. JuR., Arbitration and Award, § 142.
46 Cases cited in 3 AM. JUR., Arbitration and Award, § 142. Gregory and Orlikoff
point out that "by and large the rules formed to govern commercial arbitration consti-
tute the major source of the common law which is today applied to labor arbitra-
tions ..." Op. cit. supra note 43 at 237.
47 Luther v. Medbury, 18 R. I. 141, 26 Atl. 37 (1893). In this case the arbitrators
were unable to agree on the amount of a money award. They then agreed that each
would mark on a piece of paper the sum he thought should be awarded. These sums then
were added and the result was divided by the number of arbitrators to obtain the award
($750). One arbitrator, who marked his estimate $500, testified that he would have
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(3) where an arbitrator was drunk while testimony was being heard;
(4) where an arbitrator allowed one of the parties to "treat" him to
intoxicating liquor and the other party was not present.
It is said that partiality on the part of an arbitrator is a well-
recognized ground for setting aside an award. "It is not necessary,
in order to warrant the intervention of equity, that the partiality
be evidenced by an unjust award. It is sufficient that the relation-
ship between the arbitrators and one of the parties is of such a
nature as to give clear grounds for suspicion of their proceedings
and render it unlikely that they constituted the fair and impartial
tribunal to which the other party is entitled."4 Awards have been
impeached,"9 for instance,
(5) where the arbitrator had a material interest in the outcome of
the arbitration and the other party had not waived this objection to the
partiality of the arbitrator (of course, it is generally held that one who
consents to the appointment of a person partial to his opponent, with
full knowledge of the facts upon which the interest or bias of the
appointee is based, may not later object to the proceedings on the
ground that such partiality exists) ;
(6) where, after his appointment, and before the hearing, the arbi-
trator expressed an opinion clearly and firmly adverse to one of the
parties;
(7) where the arbitrator made his award as the result of a private
conversation with one of the parties.
The important point is that an arbitrator who understands the judi-
cial nature" of his function will remain aloof from the parties
during the hearing, lest he suggest partiality or bias. Conferences
with one party without the presence of the other, written communi-
adhered to that amount, since that was his judgment, had it not been for the agreement
to average the sums. The court held the award void and said, "The parties to a submis-
sion are entitled, under it, to the judgment of the arbitrators; and, if the method pur.
sued by them precludes the exercise of their judgment [by substituting chance], the
parties do not get that for which they have stipulated." 26 At. at 37, 38.
483 Am. JuR., Arbitration and Award, § 145.
49 Ibid. The cases cited are commercial arbitration decisions.
60 See supra note 41.
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cations from one without copies to the other and opportunity to
reply, even a friendly jaunt to the nearest coffee pot with one of
the parties: the prudent arbitrator, at the very least, should avoid
these actions.
.Timely objection must be made by an aggrieved arbitration
party as soon as he learns of the facts which indicate partiality
or bias. Otherwise he will be deemed to have waived the matter.
A court then will not disturb the award.
The extent of the arbitrator's jurisdiction normally is estab-
lished by the submission agreement. The importance of careful
and precise draftmanship of this agreement cannot be stressed too
highly. If the parties agree to submit to arbitration the question
of whether or not "the discharges of Elmer McDonald and Francis
Pauly on September 28, 1948, for... 'instigating and participa-
ting in a work stoppage' shall be sustained or reversed,"'" the
arbitrator has power to decide this question and nothing more. If
he exceeds the jurisdiction conferred on him in the submission
agreement, his award is void. Or if he acts after his power has
expired, the award is void. ".... [A]ny violation of, or exercise of
powers inconsistent with, the terms of submission renders an award
invalid.""2
Consider an example which occurred in a recent arbitration.' s
The submission agreement provided simply that the arbitrator
should determine whether or not Miss X had been fired "for
cause," and, if not, whether she should be reinstated with or without
back pay. (The company contended that Miss X was disrespectful
and rebellious toward supervisory personnel.) The arbitrator held
that Miss X had not been fired "for cause," and he ordered that
she receive back pay. But it seemed evident to him from the testi-
51 Fox Co. and Local 68, Polishers, Buffers, and Platers, 3 A. L. A. A. § 68,194
(1949).
52 3 AM. JUR., Arbitration and Award, § 123; 4 TEx. JUR., Arbitration and Award,
§ 20. It was held in Owens v. Withee, 3 Tex. 161, 166 (1848), that an award "was bad"
both at common law and by statute when rendered by five arbitrators under a submis.
sion agreement which provided for the decision of six.
58 This was an unreported 1949 Dallas arbitration.
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mony that Miss X was a chronic "trouble maker" among her fellow
workers; and so, in the interest of future industrial relations in the
firm, he ruled that Miss X should not be reinstated. He reasoned
that an arbitrator should make an award which not only would
settle the immediate controversy but also would be conducive to
continuing happier relations between the disputants."
But the union's representative protested vigorously. He argued
that the award was inconsistent with the submission agreement and
that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority. He contended that
under the submission agreement the only power the arbitrator had
was (1) to hold that Miss X was discharged for cause, in which
case she should not be reinstated, with or without back pay; or
(2) to hold that she was not discharged for cause, in which case
she would be reinstated with back pay, or without it, as the arbi-
trator should determine.
In other words, the union representative asserted that if the arbi-
trator held Miss X had not been discharged for cause, then he had
to order her reinstated. He insisted that his union, and unions in
general, would become reluctant to resort to arbitration if they
came to fear that arbitrators could not be depended upon to con-
fine themselves to the issues as spelled out in the submission agree-
ment. The union threatened to challenge the award in court on the
grounds that the arbitrator had exceeded the power the parties had
conferred upon him.55
On the other hand, an award may be attacked successfully be-
cause it is not comprehensive enough-that is, because the arbi-
trator did not exercise enough power! It is essential that an award
dispose finally of all the issues submitted in the arbitration agree-
ment. "In order to be valid, an award must be full and final on
54 This is, of course, a sound approach to arbitration, but an arbitrator, like a judge,
should not attempt to exercise jurisdiction he does not possess. That is, correctly drafted
submission agreements certainly afford arbitrators sufficient jurisdiction to hand down
awards the parties "can live together" under. But an arbitrator does arbitration a dis-
service when he exceeds the terms laid down in the submission agreement, be it ever s,
poorly drawn.
55 No record has been found that the challenge actually was made, however.
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all points submitted .... "" The rationale of this is that the object
of an arbitration proceding is to prevent future dispute on the
issues raised in the submission agreement, and an award which
leaves some of the issues undealt with simply is not final and can-
not be sustained.
If an award requires a party to do or refrain from doing an act
in violation of public policy, the award will not be enforced. For
an illustration, in 1942 President Roosevelt ordered that no
premium wage should be paid for work on any holidays except
six he listed. An arbitrator's award ordering "overtime" on an
unlisted holiday could not have been enforced because it would
have been contrary to a national policy which, Mr. Roosevelt as-
serted, was ... desirable and necessary in the prosecution of the
",57
war ....
Such, then, are the usual grounds on which an award may be
attacked successfully at common law. If arbitrators and arbitra-
tion parties will grasp the judicial nature of the arbitration process
and will not mix it with mediation and compromise, most of these
grounds will never be established.
It should be reemphasized that most courts are reluctant to dis-
turb arbitrators' awards.
"... [C]ertain ... grounds that would be sufficient in an appeal from
a judgment would not be grounds for impeaching an award, for the
reason that the contractual element is present in the award. Thus, the
fact that the arbitrator made erroneous rulings5 during the hearing,
or reached erroneous findings of fact from the evidence, is no ground
for setting aside the award, because the parties have agreed that he
should be the judge of the facts. Even his erroneous view of the law
would be binding, for the parties have agreed to accept his view of
the law."'
Of course, the submission agreement may be so drafted that the
parties require the arbitrator to govern his award by "strictly
56 3 Am. Jun., Arbitration and Award, § 128.
57 Exec. Order No. 9240, 3 C. F. R. (Cum. Supp.) 1207 (1942).
58 To be distinguished from gross unfairness in the conduct of the hearings.
59 UPDECRAFF AND McCoy, op. cit. supra note 9 at 127. Emphasis added.
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legal rules." In such a case the court will review the award and
set it aside if the arbitrator mistakes the law. 0 But this is a matter
of how the submission agreement is drafted, and the basic prin-
ciple remains that if the courts were to step in and overturn
awards because of arbitrators' errors of fact or law, "arbitration
would fail of its chief purpose; [and] instead of being a substi-
tute for litigation it would merely be the beginning of litigation."
6
'
Or, as another authority puts it, "This is the reasonable view, for
a contrary holding would mean that arbitration proceedings, in-
stead of being a quick and easy mode of obtaining justice, would
be merely an unnecessary step in the course of litigation, causing
delay and expense, but settling nothing finally."62
Of course, if an arbitrator's error of law resulted in an award
which would require one or both of the parties to commit a crime
it would be void. But an example of the kind of error of law in
point here might involve an arbitrator's misconception or misap-
plication of the parol evidence rule in a dispute arising under a
union contract. Such an error probably would not cause a court
to disturb his award.
7. CHALLENGING AN AWARD UNDER AN ARBITRATION STATUTE
Up to now the discussion has stressed the challenging of an award
at common law. Arbitration statutes "generally adopt these favor-
able common-law rules, and an award within the terms of the [sub-
mission] agreement will be vacated only where it was procured
by corruption, fraud, or undue influence, or where there was evi-
dent partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or misbehavior on
their part by which the rights of the parties have been prej-
udiced."6 ' The New York arbitration statute, for example, "codi-
60 3 AM. Jun., Arbitration and Award, § 149.
61 UPDEGRAFF AND McCoY, op. cit. supra note 9 at 127.
82 3 AM. Jun., Arbitration and Award, § 147.
Is 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. Ed. 1938) § 1929A.
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fies" the common law discussed in the preceding section, and pro-
vides that the court must vacate the award :64
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue
means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitra-
tors "or either of them;"
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing on sufficient evidence shown, or in refusing to
hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any party were prejudiced;
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them, that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject
matter submitted was not made;
(5) if there was no valid submission agreement and the aggrieved
party made timely and proper objection to that effect.
8. EXTENT OF LITIGATION INVOLVING LABOR ARBITRATION
AWARDS
After this extended discussion of litigation arising from the
enforcement or challenge of arbitration awards, it may seem anti-
climatic to say that up to now parties to labor arbitration proceed-
ings have gone to court very infrequently. Larson writes: "Per-
haps ninety or ninety-five percent of all cases of labor arbitration
arise over unsettled grievances calling into question the interpre-
tation and application of a collective [bargaining] contract [and]
in practically all of these cases.., there is no thought of avoiding
the arbitrator's award.., and there is no necessity for the award
to be made the subject of a judgment."65 In so far as arbitration
statutes are concerned, Larson points out that labor disputants
certainly have not shown any tendency to use them. "This is not to
64 N. Y. CrVIL PRACTICE ACT, § 1462. The Texas labor arbitration statute provides
that judgment shall be entered on the award ten days after a copy is filed in the district
clerk's office "unless within such ten days either party shall file exceptions thereto lot
matter of law apparent on the record...." Tax. Rav. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 248.
(Emphasis added.)
65 Larson, The Legal Status of Arbitration in the Southwest in SECOND ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON LABOR LAW (Southwestern Legal Foundation, 1950) 92, 93.
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say that the statutes are undesirable or worthless .... [But] the
necessity for even the most perfunctory report to the court seems
to frighten or disturb the parties in the usual case, and they
simply do not want to be involved in court proceedings....
[C] ommon law arbitration is overwhelmingly preferred over stat-
utory arbitration by labor disputants. "66
It should be recalled, however, that labor arbitration is rela-
tively new and undeveloped. Its greatest use thus far has been
in industries with long, mature collective bargaining experience.
The fact that in the past few awards have been challenged in such
industries does not necessarily mean that the increasingly wide-
spread use of arbitration in new industrial arenas will not see
more frequent resort to the courts by parties to arbitration pro-
ceedings. Gregory and. Orlikoff have written:
"... [I]t cannot be reasonably expected that contractual commit-
ments which may be broken with impunity will very long continue to
be rigorously observed. And in view of the greatly increased use of
arbitration, largely due to the impetus furnished by wartime measures
encouraging the peaceful settlement of industrial disputes, the extent
to which these promises will be broken is bound to increase. Such
breaches of good faith are likely to imperil the whole arbitral process.
As more and more awards and agreements to arbitrate are ignored with
impunity, the more arbitration will become just another way-station
to, rather than a rescue-station from, industrial conflict. ' '6 7
In other words, arbitration statutes, even though parties up to
now generally have ignored them, should be perfected and simpli-
fied so that arbitration agreements and awards may be enforced,
and so that awards in appropirate instances may be challenged,
with a minimum of red tape and technicality. Larson would agree:
"Even though common law arbitration is preferred in most cases,
it is desirable to have statutory procedures available if the parties wish
6 Id. at 93. UPDEGRAFF AND McCoy, op. cit. spra note 9 at 125, says, "The [statutory]
procedure for converting an award into a judgment is often followed in commercial
arbitrations, but is practically never used in labor arbitrations, first, because the parties
are anxious to avoid the courts...."
67 Op. cit. supra note 25 at 235.
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their arbitration to be under the supervision of a court and to result
in a final judgment.... [A]ny legislative device which strengthens and
encourages the use of [arbitration] should be viewed in a favorable
light." 68
9. ARBITRATOR'S AWARDS AS PRECEDENTS
Should labor arbitrators consider past awards in deciding a dis-
pute? To what extent, if any, should past awards be binding or
serve as precedents?
Some people are opposed even to the idea of publishing arbi-
trators' awards and opinions. It is said that publication might
discourage the use of arbitration because business data perhaps
would be revealed to competitors. 9 One brave and dauntless spirit
has written:
"The fact of publication itself creates the atmosphere of precedent.
The arbitrators in each subsequent dispute are submitted to the con-
tinuous and frequently unconscious pressure to conform. A bad award
... will have the effect of stimulating other bad ones; a good one, by
the weight of precedent, may be applied where the subtleties of fact
should urge a different award. '70
He has further written,
"The criticism and pressure that would flow from the publication of
their awards could not help but deter [the] willingness [of arbitrators]
to serve .... "171
This seemingly serious contention, boiled down, is: (1) do not
let arbitrators find out what other arbitrators are doing, because
they may be led astray;72 and (2) do not publish arbitrators'
awards lest their tender sensibilities be wounded past all endur-
ance by comments readers might make about their decisions and
opinion. (The slandered ostrich does not actually bury his head
in the sand: he leaves this for men to do.)
68 Larson, op. cit. supra note 65 at 93.
69 Levenstein, Some Obstacles to Reporting Labor Arbitrations, 1 Arb. J. (N. S.)
425, 428 (!1946).
70 Cherne, Should Arbitration Awards Be Published? 1 Arb. J. (N. S.) 75 (1946).
71 Id. at 76.
72 "Hear no evil, see no evil, speak no evil."
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On the other hand, it is contended that "the days of the hush-
hush period in labor-management relations" began to disappear
when the National Labor Relations Board under the Wagner Act
"laid bare for all to see many thousands of labor disputes of a
type which had previously been considered private.., disputes re-
lating to union activities.""8 Then World War II "brought about
the greatest advance of all in the pooling of every kind of infor-
mation on the day-to-day conduct of labor relations .... "'4 Even
wage discussions "were staged as in a fish bowl" in the arbitra-
tions before the War Labor Board.75 Furthermore, "labor arbitra-
tion stems from the desire to avoid strikes, which from their
nature affect the public interest. Accordingly, the secrecy which
properly surrounds commercial arbitration has no place in respect
to labor arbitration. On the contrary, publicity of labor arbitra-
tion awards can, if properly handled, be of the greatest service
both in early settlement of disputes that might otherwise go to
arbitration and in facilitating sound judgment in the awards when
resort is made to arbitration. "76
These arguments are persuasive: arbitration awards and opin-
ions certainly should be published. The regrettable thing is that
they have long lain buried in private files and that only recently
a body of arbitration "case law" has begun to become available.7"
Whether or not one favors the use of arbitration awards and
opinions as "precedents" depends a great deal on his conception
of what that term means. It has been argued (1) that the use of
awards as "precedents" would bring inflexibility and formality
into what should be a growing and adaptable process, thus sacri-
ficing "justice and progress" for uniformity of decisions; (2) that
"the arbitrator searches for a rule of reason which will render





77 Prentice-Hall began to publish selected arbitration awards in 1946 (A. L. A. A.
s-eries) ; a Bureau of National Affairs series got under way in i§48.'
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justice and at the same time permit the parties to continue 'living
together;' " and (3) that each case must be decided on its own be-
cause the "rule of reason" is "determined in part by the charac-
ter of the disputants-by their economic position, their strength
or weakness, their importance to the community, the history of
their past relationships, and their objectives in taking their pres-
ent stand.
'8
That is all well and good if the only use of awards as precedents
is simply a slavish following and mechanical application of deci-
sions in past arbitrations. But that simply is not a common-sense
conception of the precedential value of awards. It is reminiscent
of heated denunciations of the doctrine of stare decisis which
have been voiced out of misunderstanding of that doctrine's true
significance in the law. This doctrine under our common law sys-
tem "has not the inexorable action with which many persons care-
lessly endow it." 79 The degree of control given to a prior decision
varies with the particular case.
If the rule of stare decisis demanded unvarying and rigid ad-
herence to precedents "then there might be good ground for the
persistence among the uninformed of the erroneous idea [that
certainty in law is preferable to reason and correct legal princi-
ples], but the proper American conception comprehends stare
decisis as a flexible doctrine, under which the degree of control
to be allowed a prior judicial determination depends largely on
the nature of the question at issue, the circumstances attending its
decision, and, perhaps, somewhat on the attitude of individual
participating judges.""0 Furthermore, "except in [certain classes
of cases], when a court is faced with an ancient decision, rendered
under conditions of society radically different from those of to-
day, and when it is sought to have this ancient decision control
78 Levenstein, op. cit. supra note 69 at 426.
79 Elkouri, The Precedential Force of Labor Arbitration Awards, 3 Okla. L. Rev. 260
(1950).




present-day conditions, even though the attending facts in the two
controversies be alike, still there is nothing in the doctrine of stare
decisis to prevent a departure from the earlier decision and [in
the absence of legislative enactment covering the matter] the
restatement of the governing rule there laid down, or acted on,
to meet the change in the life of the people to serve whose best
interests it was originally invoked.""1
Chamberlain has summarized the American doctrine of stare
decisis by saying,
"A deliberate or solemn decision of a court or judge, made after
argument on a question of law fairly arising in a case, and necessary
to its determination, is an authority, or binding precedent, in the same
court or in other courts of equal or lower rank, in subsequent cases,
where 'the very point' is again in controversy; but the degree of author-
ity belonging to such a precedent depends, of necessity, on its agree-
ment with the spirit of the times or the judgment of subsequent tri-
bunals upon its correctness as a statement of the existing or actual law,
and the compulsion or exigency of the doctrine is, in the last analysis,
moral and intellectual, rather than arbitrary or inflexible."8 2
Even in the- law, then, it is not advocated that past decisions be
followed blindly. And certainly no one would urge an inexorable
doctrine of stare decisis for labor arbitration. If it appears that
the arbitrator in an apparent "precedent" used obviously bad
judgment, or made serious errors in fact or law, the prior award
should be ignored. Or if there is an indication that a prior award
was made without full disclosure of all pertinent facts or without
a fair hearing, the earlier award should not be followed. Perhaps
new conditions have arisen which make it inadvisable to follow
an earlier award. And quite frequently alleged "precedents"
simply are not "on all fours" with the dispute at hand, and the
fact situations differ. In such cases the earlier award can be
distinguished from the controversy at hand, and certainly should
81 Id. at 418.
82 CHAMBEaLAIN, THE DocTRN.E OF STARE DEcisls (1885) 19; quoted in von Mosch.
zisker, op. cit. supra note 80 at 409; emphasis added.
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not be followed. Indeed, many entirely "new" industrial relations
disputes arise every day, and for them there simply is no prece-
dent.
But, subject to these qualifications, where a "prior decision in-
volves the interpretation of the identical contract provision be-
tween the same company and union, every principle of common
sense, policy, and labor relations demands that it stand until the
parties annul it by a newly worded contract provision. '"" That is,
under these conditions it would seem that the prior decision should
be a controlling precedent. (Indeed, some collective bargaining
contracts provide that arbitrators' rulings interpreting clauses of
the agreement shall become part of the contract.)8 4
Inflexibility in labor-management relations there certainly must
not be. But the meaning of collective bargaining contract clauses
as established by valid arbitration proceedings must be in large
measure certain if management and unions are to make prompt
and effective day-to-day decisions. If one party feels it can chal-
lenge past awards at any time with a good chance of overturning
them, then the judicial function of arbitration has not been real-
ized. Permanent umpires probably recognize this stabilizing effect
of following precedent in arbitration awards more keenly than do
ad hoc arbitrators, and "there is a tendency for permanent um-
pires to publish their awards for the guidance of both unions and
management, and to decline to accept cases which do not present
issues or involve situations different from those previously con-
sidered." 5 But ad hoc arbitrators, too, should study very carefully
83 Pan American Refining Corp., 2 A. L. A. A. § 67,937 (1948), Whitley P. McCoy,
Arbitrator.
84 On the other hand, consider these collective agreement clauses:
"(d) Each case shall be considered on its merits and the collective agreement shall
constitute the basis upon which decisions shall be rendered, and no decision need neces-
sarily constitute a precedent for any subsequent case." Eastern Women's Headwear
Ass'n and United Hatters, Cap & Military Workers Union.
"Each case shall be considered on its merits and the collective agreement shal con-
tinue the basis upon which decisions shall be rendered. No decision shall be u1ed a, a
precedent for any other subsequent case." Nat'l Dress Mfgrs' Ass'n and Joint Board Dress
& Waistmakers Union of Greater N. Y. & ILGWU. See 5 C. L. E. § 64,214.
s5 Elkouri, op. cit. supra note 79 at 263.
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the awards of other arbitrators under the particular contract in
question. And in the absence of compelling reasons for ignoring
earlier awards on closely similar fact situations, they should be
bound thereby.
Suppose Firm A and Union B carry a dispute to arbitration
and, though it has never come up between them before, very
similar awards are available involving other companies and their
employees. Should such awards be controlling on Firm A and
Union B, or should they be merely "persuasive?" It certainly can
be argued that such awards should not be as controlling as would
prior awards under the Firm A-Union B contract. But they should
be considered carefully by A and B in preparing their "cases,"
and by the arbitrator in making his award and writing his opinion.
It almost always is helpful to see how someone else has dealt
with one's own immediate problem. Sometimes one benefits simply
by noting how the other fellow fouled up the situation-an object
lesson in what not to do. Most often the value lies in observing
deft touches in the prior handling. Pertinent angles and slants are
suggested which otherwise might have escaped unnoticed. As
Taylor points out, awards and opinions from other firms on closely
similar fact situations should help Firm A and Union B be-
cause:
".... [O]ne party at least has a ready-made argument to support his
case. The other party may find a contrary precedent. Both may
profit from the way in which the issue was formulated for the arbi-
trator."' 6
Firm A and Union B should not hesitate in citing such prior
awards from other companies in their arguments to their own
arbitrator.8 7 This will tend to keep the arbitrator on his toes. And
"few arbitrators would object to obtaining hints in deciding a
86 Taylor, op. cit. supra note 73 at 422.
87 Note that this statement refers to awards arising under contracts other than their




doubtful issue from other awards which appeared to be thought-
fully and fairly reasoned.""8 That is, such awards, though not
necessarily controlling, might be persuasive. "The considered
judgment of one arbitrator cannot be dismissed lightly or ignored,
especially if he is a seasoned observer of industrial relations, or
if he is a widely known and respected authority."
Under some conditions, then, prior arbitration awards may be
controlling in a given situation; under other conditions, earlier
awards may merely be persuasive. Their force and weight are a
matter of degree reflecting the times and conditions in a given
arbitration. They do not offer an arbitrator a quick-and unques-
tionable "answer" to the dispute he has just heard. But if he
studies carefully prior awards and opinions in closely similar fact
situations, he in all probability will come up with a better award
and opinion of his own than he otherwise would have turned out.
10. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The award is the actual decision of the arbitrator. It may or
may not be accompanied by an opinion, though an opinion cer-
tainly is highly desirable. At common law no particular form of
award is prescribed. Arbitration statutes, however, usually fix pre-
cise requirements as to form, and these must be complied with
strictly if the award is to be enforceable under such an enactment.
Possibly, however, as in Texas, an award defective in form under
a statute still may be enforceable at common law.
The award is neither a contract nor a judgment, though it par-
takes of the nature of both. It results from a contract-the sub-
mission agreement-but it is not itself a contract, since it is the
act of the arbitrator and not of the parties themselves. It is like a
judgment in that, if it is valid, it is binding upon the parties
though imposed by an outside force. It is an extra-judicial judg-
88 Taylor, op. cit. supra note 73 at 422.
81 Elkouri, op. cit. supra note 79 at 266.
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ment of a tribunal selected by the parties and given power by
their act.
In contrast to its attitude toward submission agreements, the
common law favors the enforcement of arbitration awards. It
appears that in general the award may be either the subject of a
suit at law to recover money damages, or a suit in equity to obtain
a decree of specific performance. Teller suggests that a "new juris-
prudence" is developing in that "remedies applicable to collec-
tive agreements are viewed entirely different by the courts from
remedies relating to individual employment contracts," 'o which
courts traditionally have been disinclined to enforce specifically.
He believes that today the maintenance of a management-union
relationship under a collective bargaining agreement is a general
ground of equity jurisdiction, and that the cases seem to be tend-
ing toward greater recognition of the propriety of specific enforce-
ment of arbitration awards.
Almost all the general arbitration statutes provide that awards
may be made court judgments on motion of either party or on the
mere filing of the award in court. The New York statute is a good
example.
Though it is not certain that the Federal Arbitration Act applies
to arbitration of labor disputes pursuant to a clause in a collective
bargaining agreement, the federal Act, like many of the general
state arbitration statutes, provides that awards may be confirmed
by court order. The Railway Labor Act provides an elaborate pro-
cedure for enforcing arbitration awards involving employees of
interstate railroads and common carrier airlines engaged in inter-
state or foreign commerce.
It is quite difficult to impeach an award successfully. In gen-
eral, an award stipulated by the parties to be final will not be
set aside "unless it is clearly made to appear that there has been
fraud by a party, or the arbitrators have mistaken their authority,
departed from the submission, clearly misconceived their duties,
90 Teller, Specific Remedies in Labor Arbitration, 3 Arb. J. (N. S.) 178 (1948).
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acted upon some fundamental and apparent mistake, or have been
moved by fraud or bias." 1 In general, the courts are quite reluct-
ant to set aside an award because the arbitrator made an error of
fact or law. The reasoning is that the parties agreed that the
arbitrator should be the judge of the facts and that they would
accept his view of the law: in other words, they agreed that arbi-
tration would be a substitute for litigation, not just an unneces-
sary step in the course of litigation. It is, of course, possible for
an arbitrator to make such serious errors of law that a court will
have no choice but to set aside the award.
The arbitration statutes generally adopt these common law
rules governing the challenging of an award. The New York
statute, for instance, merely codifies the common law discussed
in the preceding paragraph.
Up to now parties to labor arbitration proceedings have gone
to court very infrequently. In general there has been no thought
of avoiding the arbitrator's award. And labor disputants have
shown little tendency to use the arbitration statutes, common law
arbitration being overwhelmingly preferred. It should be re-
called, however, that labor arbitration is relatively new and un-
developed. And its greatest use thus far has been in industries
with long and mature collective bargaining experience. As the
use of arbitration increases in industrial areas which are rela-
tively new to collective bargaining, there is likely to be more
frequent resort to the courts by arbitration parties. It follows that
arbitration statutes should be perfected and simplified in every
state so that awards may be enforced or challenged with a mini-
mum of red tape and technicality. It is suggested, too, that the
excellent Federal Arbitration Act be amended to make its appli-
cability to labor disputes beyond question. Knowledge by man-
agement and unions that awards and arbitration agreements can-
not be ignored with impunity will contribute to the continued
growth of arbitration as a dispute-settling process.
91 3 AM. JUR., Arbitration and Award, § 137.
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Arbitrators' opinions and awards are fruitful documents and
should be published and made available to arbitrators, manage-
ment, and unions. But it has been only within the last four or five
years that significant publication has begun. The extent to which
prior awards should serve as "precedents" depends on the facts
and conditions in a given arbitration situation. Inflexibility in
labor-management relations certainly must be avoided. But if a
"prior decision involves the interpretation of the identical con-
tract provision between the same company and union, every prin-
ciple of common sense, policy, and labor relations demands that
it stand until the parties annul it by a newly worded contract
provision."92 That is, under these conditions it may be that the
prior award should be a controlling precedent.
Under other conditions it certainly is admitted that prior awards
may simply be more or less persuasive. Earlier awards and opin-
ions admittedly do not offer an arbitrator a quick and unquestion-
able answer to a dispute he has just heard. But if he studies prior
awards and opinions in closely similar fact situations, even if
they concern parties other than the immediate ones, he in all
probability will come up with a better solution than he other-
wise would have turned out. The study of arbitration awards by
the parties should help them in preparing their cases. If they
cite prior awards in their arguments and briefs the arbitrator
will be kept on his toes-and, since skilled and able arbitrators
are still the exception rather than the rule, it may not be at all un-
usual to find one with a tendency to slog along through the arbi-
tration process on the very flattest part of his feet.
92 Pan American Refining Corp., 2 A. L. A. A. § 67,937 (1948).
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